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Coordinating Sub-nationals for Global Climate Governance

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Ayodele Babalola*

Introduction

It is no longer news that in addition to the role of state-actors in climate governance, non-state actors also called sub-nationals play remarkable roles in climate governance. The number of sub-nationals involved in climate governance is increasing tremendously by the day and we are beginning to see inter-subnational efforts aimed at reduction of GHG emissions level globally. There is the need for the various Inter-Subnational efforts to be properly coordinated for effectiveness, efficiency and equity.  This Article expounds on the effectiveness that can be attained by creating a regional sub-national framework within the existing Inter-subnational framework. This will also assist in easier determination of the efficiency of policy actions. The Article also suggests that it is equitable to establish an Inter-Subnational Fund to support research, technical assistance, adaptation and mitigation in most vulnerable, underdeveloped and developing sub-nationals.

Background

Initiatives by sub-nationals to reduce global warming will benefit immensely from coordination and restructuring. Sub-nationalism in climate governance keeps growing daily in response to the slow paced and unpredictable traditional method of international multilateralism thus there is the need to ensure that this growth is properly structured for effectiveness, efficiency and equity.It used to be the case that classical top down approaches emphasized the global character of the climate change problem, and international multilateralism seen as cooperative efforts between nation-states was the central and most appropriate forum for climate governance.[i] We have progressed way beyond that as there are several other ways through which international efforts are being applied towards global climate change and climate governance. Today, a network of state and local governments, private firms and NGOs are actively addressing climate change and other environmental problems, with or without the help of their national governments.[ii]These networks are often referred to as sub-nationals and their approach to global climate governance has been variously referred to as transnational[iii] or polycentric.[iv]

Research associated with Vincent and ElinorOstrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University indicates that polycentric approach is preferable to monocentric methods even in attending to the issue of climate governance as it provides a “greater opportunity for experimentation, choice and learning” across levels of social organization and also has the tendency to “enhance innovation, learning, adaptation, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more effective, equitable and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales[v].

There are sub-national efforts at climate governance at both the inter-subnational and sub-national levels. The Under2 Coalition is an inter-subnational network that brings together 170 governments, mostly sub-nationals, spanning six continents and 33 countries committing to reduce their Green House Gas (GHG) emissions towards net-zero by 2050.[vi] The California Cap and Trade Scheme is a mandatory scheme establishing a state wide GHG emissions limit to be achieved by 2020 that is equivalent to the 1990 state of GHG emissions level with respect to covered entities and providing a trading mechanism for compliance instruments.[vii] There are also networks in the private sector[viii] and environmental groups[ix] all committed towards reducing global warming and in the process taking up  roles in climate governance.

Uncoordinated Sub-national Networks

The above stated and many more have brought about the emergence of a highly differentiated global system of subnational/transnational climate governance. There is presently no mechanism or system that brings together all the existing subnational/transnational networks to ascertain effectiveness, efficiency and equity in global emissions reduction. As it stands, it is difficult to ascertain what has been achieved so far in terms of emissions reduction from global subnational efforts across board. There are also equity issues stemming from implementation challenges largely due to local peculiarities and the absence of a proper structure and funding mechanism in place to assist low income sub-nationals to live up to their commitments. The resultant effect of this is that low income sub-nationals achieve next to nothing. Also due to the uncoordinated large sub-national networks, it is difficult to estimate the costs and to aggregate the benefits of sub-national climate governance (to determine efficiency) due to the contradictory policies and actions from a broader group of actors. Constitutional constraints within a federalist system also impact on the jurisdiction of the sub-nationals in the area of climate policy making. Competing socio-economic issues in underdeveloped sub-nationals have also raised massive concerns that mitigation efforts will hamper attempts to effectively fight poverty and this has also militated against proper coordination of sub-nationals.

The Need for a Coordinated Inter-Subnational Network

Global climate is rapidly but adversely changing. Human influence on the climate system is clear and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history having widespread impacts on human and natural systems.[x] Warming of the climate system is unequivocal and since the 1950’s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.[xi] Global sea level rose about 8 inches in the last century but the rate in the last two decades is nearly double of the last century[xii]. There is also an unprecedented global temperature rise driven largely by increased carbon dioxide and other human made emissions into the atmosphere. Most of the warming occurred in the past 35 years with 16 of the 17 warmest years on record occurring since 2001 and 2016 being the warmest year on record.[xiii] There has also been sea rise, warming oceans, shrinking ice sheets, declining artic sea ice, glacial retreat and ocean acidification.[xiv]

The importance of sub-nationals in curtailing the expansion of the greenhouse effect is clear. Studies have shown that subnational actors – cities are central to any serious plan to tackle climate change as they can deliver almost half the carbon reductions needed to meet climate targets.[xv]Taking account of direct and indirect emissions, studies also suggest that urban areas account for 67-76% of global energy use and 71-76% of global energy related CO2 emissions.[xvi] As of 2011, more than 52% of the world’s population – roughly 3.6 billion – lived in the urban areas and by 2050, the urban population is expected to increase to 5.6-7.1 billion, or 64-69% of the world population.[xvii] The result of this increase is that cities will expand by 56-310% between 2000 and 2030 also meaning that majority of infrastructure-land use, transport choice, housing in cities are yet to be built presenting an opportunity for a new vista for GHG mitigation.[xviii] As decentralization has progressed, regional, state and local governments increasingly manage significant resources. Urban areas are usually the first to feel the impact of climate change as they are mostly coastal areas. 

Coordination of Inter-Subnational Efforts

There is no doubt that sub-nationals are crucial for climate change and as such should be at the forefront of climate governance. If that is the case, then there is the need for coordinated and structured inter-subnational efforts to improve effectiveness, efficiency and equity in climate governance. Coordination of global subnational efforts at climate governance will be more effective, efficient and equitable with the introduction of regionalism within the existing global structure and an Inter-Subnational Climate Fund.

Regional networks with the membership of all regional sub-nationals involved in climate governance including states, cities, corporations, environmental groups and climate research organizations will prove to be effective in assisting sub-nationals fulfil their commitments to GHG emissions reduction. Based on the “subsidiarity principle” which proposes that social problems are best dealt with at the level most closely related to the problem, it is more effective for sub-nationals to be at the forefront of climate governance. It is also pertinent that they be coordinated regionally as there is usually uniformity of climate effects and policies within particular regions that will make for easy coordination. Within the U2 Coalition framework for example, regional groups for North Africa (NA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) will come in handy. These regions require technical support and advice on how to fulfill commitments to GHG emissions reduction. Only one sub-national from Nigeria (Cross River State) in SSA is currently within the U2 Coalition framework and this sub-national requires technical support first and primarily in the area of GHG emissions statistics. This is the first step for all sub–nationals interested in GHG emissions reduction. There is also a general need for emissions statistics in Sub-Saharan region. These sub-nationals need to know how much GHG is being emitted in their jurisdiction before they can effectively commit to cutting down emissions below any particular level. As for the sub-nationals in NA and SSA who are yet to come on board, climate change campaigns should be embarked on with the collaboration of those that have already signed on within the same region. Apart from the present cap and trade arrangement between a few sub-nationals in North America, it is also desirable that a North American sub-national network be structured within the existing Under2Coalition framework with a membership of all sub-nationals in the region working towards achieving a similar target with similar policies and actions. This will also be more effective based on the subsidiarity theory. There can also be a regional cap and trade market with players from all sub-nationals within the region. A regional structure here will also lead to a broader impact on emissions reduction and reduce carbon leakage within the region.

The existence of regional structures might assist in determining more easily the efficiency of climate actions and policies embarked on by sub-nationals in the region. Costs and benefits of sub-national efforts can be aggregated easily at regional levels when all stakeholders come together under the same umbrella within which similar actions and policies are being employed. With regional structures also comes a greater sense of responsibility borne out of greater trust and common purpose. This can be a basis for some form of “subtle constraint” on sub-nationals to fulfill commitments which might be otherwise unattainable. There is also the need for regional technical expert assistance in least developed and developing sub-nationals in the area of developing emissions statistics, research, publications and databases which will form a viable basis for further climate governance policy actions at the regional level. With this in place, the least developed and developing sub-nationals will know the proper tools to employ in climate governance with respect to any area/aspect over which they have control and this ensures that the overall process is more effective. 

At the inter-subnational level, an Inter-subnational Climate Fund should be established as a stand-alone multilateral financing entity with a sole mandate to support the efforts of sub-nationals by delivering mitigation, adaptation and low emission technology funding. The Fund should be serviced by sub-nationals from developed countries and international donors to address various mitigation and adaptation needs of vulnerable, least developed and developing sub-nationals in that order. This Fund is innovative in the sense that it seeks to utilize inter-subnational climate finance to invest in research, mitigation and adaptation efforts by sub-nationals. These investments can be in form of grants, loans, equity or guarantees all geared towards the specific situation of the particular sub-national and also available to both sub-nationals and private entities. This sort of climate finance investment in sub-national projects will more importantly shape private behavior especially in most vulnerable, least developed and developing sub-nationals. However, there must be an effective mechanism for monitoring of climate finance disbursed to any sub-national to ensure that there is proper accountability. Monitoring can be structured also at the regional level in collaboration with the Fund. The Fund should be accountable to an Inter-subnational Secretariat, preferably California for obvious reasons. The Fund is a good way to ensure equity in the inter-subnational climate change scheme by providing climate finance for the most vulnerable, least developed and developing sub-nationals who might not be able to fulfill commitments largely due to socio-economic problems.

Obstacles on the path of Effective Coordination of Inter-Subnational Efforts

There are several arguments against the coordination of inter-subnational climate governance at the subnational, regional or global level. Firstly, there is the issue of constitutional restraint. Some emission reduction policies are not within the jurisdiction of sub-nationals and encroaching in such area may cause a faceoff between the national and sub-national systems of individual countries. For example, in most countries sub-nationals do not regulate emissions from transient sources like cars. This is an issue usually left to the federal government. Secondly, there is the issue of possible duplicity. It might also seem like efforts by sub-nationals geared towards reduction of GHG emissions amount to a duplication because a good number of countries where these sub-nationals are already have endorsed the Paris Agreement and also have Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC), a requirement by the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.[xix] Thirdly, there might also be doubts concerning compliance with emissions reduction targets by sub-nationals due to social problems. Fourthly, some global leaders believe that climate change is a hoax. Lastly, there are also arguments being canvassed as to whether sub-nationals have the authority to enter into regional or inter-subnational agreements with respect to climate governance or for any other purpose.

Obstacles or Stepping Stones?

Country-centered efforts on GHG emissions reduction and their ongoing negotiations have been criticized for being cumbersome and insufficiently effective.[xx] Maybe this means that if properly organized, the sub-nationals can attain remarkable reductions in GHG emissions.

The first issue of constitutional restraint usually occurs in federal and unitary governments where the constitution or the laws of the country provides the central government with jurisdiction over critical sectors that impact on climate change. Major sectors that impact on climate change include: industry, transportation, building and waste. In the USA for example, sub-nationals like California play a major role in regulating industry emissions. In some other countries like Nigeria, even though the states have roles they play in setting certain environmental standards, the primary piece of environmental legislation is at the federal level[xxi]. This legislation established a Federal Agency responsible for protecting Nigeria’s environment and for enforcing all laws, regulations, guidelines and standards. The Agency’s jurisdiction includes enforcement of compliance with air quality standards in atmospheric emissions, vehicular emissions, open burning, refrigeration and air-conditioning equipment and noise. This same body is also in charge of quality control of surface waters and ground water. It also has the powers to enforce environmental conventions, treaties and protocols to which Nigeria is a signatory. Electricity policies and regulations are also controlled at the federal level[xxii].There is also subnational jurisdiction largely in the area of waste disposal and enforcement of unlawful discharge. While the federal government has jurisdiction over industrial and transportation emissions and discharge, the states have a big role in waste disposal and housing in Nigeria. Control of different sectors that impact climate change varies from country to country. However, sub-nationals are never left without a role to play in climate governance. This gives sub-nationals a wide range of areas to formulate policies to attain a regional or global goal. With the recent possibility of the abandonment of the Paris Agreement by President Donald Trump, the efforts of sub-nationals like the State of California towards combatting global warming will be more appreciated. However, in an environment where climate policies at the federal level conflict with that at the subnational level, the sub-nationals can seek proactive ways to lobby the federal government through consultation and mobilization of environmental groups. However, if the federal government is not forthcoming, there is always some jurisdiction left for the sub-nationals to engage in climate governance.

It is better to have duplicated efforts at emissions reduction than to leave it entirely in the hands of the central government. While the federal government strives to reduce GHG emissions in areas over which it has jurisdiction, it is desirable for sub-nationals to also do the same in areas which they have jurisdiction. The combined effort of both levels of administration takes the country closer to meeting its commitment under the Paris Agreement and also moves the sub-national closer to achieving its target. Duplicity is good for climate governance.

Concerns about sub-nationals complying with emissions reduction policies due to competing social issues like poverty in most vulnerable, underdeveloped and developing countries can be taken care of by the Inter-Subnational Climate Fund which will be applied towards assistance in policy implementation, Investments in clean technology, personnel training, mitigation and adaptation.

Overwhelming available scientific evidence on climate change proves that it is a problem that needs urgent attention and not a hoax. Extreme global temperatures, global sea rise, excessive flooding just to mention a few have been linked to the emission activities of man.[xxiii] Denial of the existence and adverse effects of climate change will not do the world any good. The earlier we put all resources possible to curtail it, the better.

The most important argument is whether sub-nationals have the authority to enter into regional or inter-subnational agreements with respect to climate governance. The issue is not whether the sub-nationals are willing to enter into inter-subnational agreements for climate governance. The Under2Coalition[xxiv] for example has successfully brought together 176 jurisdictions with individual commitments all geared towards GHG emissions reduction. Where do these sub-nationals derive such authority from? The Paris Agreement actually created a backdoor for sub-nationals to take actions in climate governance thus it can be said that they derive their authority from the Paris Agreement itself. The Agreement recognizes the role of non-Party stakeholders in addressing climate change including cities, other sub-national authorities, civil society, the private sector and others. It invites them to scale up their efforts and support actions to reduce emissions, build resilience and decrease vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change; uphold and promote regional and international cooperation.[xxv] The agreement has built in mechanism for sub-nationals to enter parallel pledges through the United Nations Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NACZA) portal. This does not necessarily give sub-nationals party status in the legal sense but effectively lets them do the same thing. They can submit emissions reduction targets and declare these to the world. The Under2Coalition is one of such inter-subnational efforts. A follow up question is whether if a country pulls out of the Paris agreement, the carpet is taken off the feet of its sub-nationals and they have no jurisdiction to continue with the goals of the Paris agreement or to enter into inter-subnational coalitions. This question has become important in the light of indications that President Trump would pull the US out of the Paris Agreement and propose a renegotiated one or a new one entirely. We might understand the issues here better by examining the actual or likely reaction of sub-nationals to the pulling out by their countries. Should the US sub-nationals, especially California, who are at the forefront of uniting the inter-subnational community, be worried? Apparently, that does not seem to be the case as California and other US sub-nationals seem to be unaffected by this threat. Recently, California Governor Jerry Brown met with the Chinese president Xi Jinping to talk about climate change. It looked like a meeting between heads of states. California, two other US State governors, 30 mayors, more than 80 university presidents and over 100 businesses have formed a coalition and are in talks to submit their own climate pledge to the UN and become a party to the Paris agreement to fill the space that the US under President Trump is likely to vacate.[xxvi]This move however seems unlikely as the Paris Agreement was endorsed by Countries. What this goes to show however is that the sub-nationals in the US are ready to forge ahead with climate governance with or without the federal government. Furthermore, the authority of sub-nationals to enter into inter-subnational coalitions with respect to GHG emissions reduction in areas over which they have controlling jurisdiction and which impact on climate change cannot be faulted.

Conclusion                          

As we have seen, sub-nationals are very crucial to the attainment of any GHG emissions reduction target. We have also seen that when sub-nationals come together globally or regionally to commit to GHG emissions reduction, milestones can be attained. It should be stressed again that even though inter-subnational efforts in climate governance is laudable, it is also important that policies aimed at climate governance are effective, efficient and equitable. Effectiveness can be attained by introducing a regional structure to the existing inter-subnational framework where similar climate governance policies are adopted in response to similar adverse climate effects. This as we have seen can minimize carbon leakage within the region and also introduce a “subtle legal constraint” borne out of similarities in circumstances and proximity to sub-nationals. This in turn will ease the efficiency determining process. This paper also introduced the need for the establishment of an Inter-Subnational Climate Fund to assist most vulnerable, underdeveloped and developing sub-nationals in implementing policies formulated towards reducing GHG emissions as well as in adaptation and mitigation. Funds disbursed through this initiative should be monitored by the Fund in collaboration with the particular regional structure where the benefiting sub-national or private entity is situated.Coordination of Inter-Subnational efforts is a necessity. While we celebrate the global enthusiasm displayed by sub-nationals, it is desirable that we stop for a minute to measure in real terms what progress has been achieved. In order to do this, we have to take the first crucial step of coordinating inter-subnational efforts.


*Ayodele Babalola is qualified to practice law in Nigeria and has an LL.M (Master of Laws) with specialization in Environmental & Energy Law and Public Law from the University of California, Berkeley. He is the Founding Partner, AOB Willows LP where he leads the Dispute Resolution, Environment & Elections Practice

[i] Marcel J. Dorsch and Christian Flachsland, A Polycentric Approach to Global Climate Governance: Global Environmental Politics 17:2, May 2017, 45-64

[ii] Dan Farber, Thinking Globally, Acting Transnationally, Legal Planet: Insight & Analysis: Environmental Law and Policy (2017), online at http://legal-planet.org/2017/05/08/thinking-globally-acting visited on 7/3/17

[iii]Ibid

[iv]ElinorOstrom, “A Policycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change: Background Paper to the 2010 World Development Report, Policy Research Working Paper 5095

[v]Ostrom E. Polycentric Systems for coping with collective actions and global environmental change. Glob. Environ. Change  20, 550-557 (2010)

[vi]Details about the Under2 Coalition can be found online at http://under2mou.org/the-mou/ visited on 6/2/17

[vii] Association of Irritated Residents v State Air Resources Bd. [2012] 206 Cal.App.4th 1487,1498, fn.6 describing how a cap-and-trade system works generally

[viii]E.g Investor Network on Climate Risk (ICNR), a network of more than 120 institutional investors representing more than $15 trillion in assets committed to addressing climate change and other key sustainability risks, while building low-carbon investment opportunities.

[ix]E.g Sierra Club with its International Beyond Coal Project.

[x] Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report, Summary for Policy Makers: IPCC Fifth Assessment Report. Can be found online at https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf visited on 7/3/17

[xi]Ibid

[xii]Ibid, also see https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/ visited on 7/3/17

[xiii]Ibid, also see https://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/news/20170118/ visited on 7/3/17

[xiv] See evidence of climate change at http://climate.nasa.gov/evidence visited on 7/3/17

[xv] David Roberts (updated), Cities are central to any serious plan to tackle climate change at https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/12/6/13832466/cities-climate-change visited on 7/3/17

[xvi] Statement by Renate Christ, ADP Technical Expert Meeting: Urban Environment: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Bonn, June 10, 2014

[xvii]Ibid

[xviii]Ibid

[xix] http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php visited on 6/4/17

[xx]For criticisms of country-centered efforts at GHG emissions reduction, see: https://www.die-gdi.de/en/briefing-paper/article/proposal-for-a-global-framework-for-climate-action-to-engage-non-state-and-subnational-stakeholders-in-the-future-climate-regime/ visited on 7/30/17

[xxi] National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act, 2011 Last Amended 2018

[xxii] See Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission at www.nercng.org visited on 7/30/17

[xxiii] Scientific consensus on adverse effects of Climate Change: See https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/ visited on 7/30/17

[xxiv]See Subnational Global Climate Leadership Memorandum of Understanding: http://under2mou.org/coalition/ visited on 7/30/17

[xxv] For the role of non-party stakeholders in the Paris Agreement, See: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf visited on 7/30/17

[xxvi]On the present move by US sub-nationals, see: https://qz.com/999980/how-us-states-and-companies-can-join-the-paris-agreement-despite-trumps-exit/ visited on 7/30/17

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